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Golden visa programmes are likely to become more attractive for countries searching
for a shot of foreign investment to recover from the COVID-19 crisis. But do they
work? Kristin Surak writes that golden visas typically bring in no more than 0.3 per cent
of GDP in revenues and aren’t large enough to make a difference in real estate markets,
except for Greece. Citizens from other EU countries represent a much larger proportion
of foreign investors and are more likely to destabilise real estate markets than the
wealthy, often racially distinct “others” from outside Europe who sign up for golden visa
programmes.
 
Half of all EU member states, along with the UK, hosts “golden visa,” or “residence by
investment” (RBI) programmes, which offer residence permits to investors. The right to
reside in a country can be extended on many grounds, but these schemes often raise
eyebrows because the investment is “passive”. To qualify, the investor just parks his or
her money in the country – typically around €250,000 or so in real estate, government
bonds, or business investments.
These channels stand apart from business or entrepreneurial programmes, which
require an “active” involvement in the investment, i.e., besides economic capital, the
applicant also contributes human capital to the country. Golden visas are also different
from “golden passports,” or “citizenship by investment” programmes because what’s on
offer is residence, not citizenship.  Those seeking golden visas tend to be the newly
wealthy from outside the Global North, with Chinese accounting for around half of all
demand.
Golden visa programmes are ostensibly set up to meet economic needs – but do they?
They have been accused of being a mere symptom of neoliberalisation that possibly
destabilises real estate markets and brings negative macroeconomic consequences.
Analysing new data with Yusuke Tsuzuki, I investigated the economic origins and
outcomes of the residence by investment programmes in the EU, including the UK during
its period of membership. The study is part of the  rst systematic investigation of the
uptake and outcomes of these programmes in Europe.
Figure 1. Residence by investment (RBI) programmes in EU member states to 2020
Currently, the programmes attract around €3 billion in investment to the EU annually.
However, the yields are not spread equally. Most of the money goes into Greece,
Portugal, and Spain, each of which takes in around €750 million through the
programmes. The recently Brexited UK accrues a similar amount each year as well. It’s
not merely pocket cash at stake.
Figure 2. Revenue by country
Sources: Bulgaria: Investment Bulgaria. Estonia: Police and Border Guard Board. Greece: Enterprise Greece. Hungary: immigration and Asylum
O ce. Ireland: Department of Justice and Equality. Latvia: o ce of Citizenship and Migration Affairs. Luxembourg: Ministry of Foreign and
European Affairs. Netherlands: Immigration and Naturalisation Service. Portugal: Immigration and Border Service. Spain: Ministry of Labour and
Migration. UK: Home O ce.
What makes countries turn to golden visas as a revenue source? Carrying out a
regression analysis, we found that countries do indeed start programmes following
economic declines and are more likely to do so after economic crises. They also tend to
select investment options tooled to meet economic needs. Notably, a decline in GDP
growth is not correlated with greater restrictiveness, but rather the opposite. That is,
governments of weakening economies are more likely to launch golden visa schemes,
suggesting that they are treated as more like economic tools than immigration-related
ones.
Furthermore, it doesn’t matter whether the political left or right is in power: governments
from across the political spectrum implement the programmes. Nor do countries start
programmes because others have them: there is no contagion effect. We also found
that investors, when they are shopping for options, behave like tourists and pro t-
oriented businesspeople, rather than as settlement-oriented immigrants. Conditions
related to the long-term quality of life were not signi cant, while tourism and the
potential to make a pro t on the investment were. The investors appear more like mobile
“ exible citizens” who use the programmes to multiply their options and their  nances,
rather than as a tool for immigration.
What about the economic impact? In some countries, the programmes represent a
sizeable proportion of foreign direct investment (FDI). In Latvia and Portugal, the golden
visa schemes have brought in well over 10 per cent of FDI over time, and in Greece it
tops 7 per cent. Yet, put into perspective, the numbers are less eye-catching: in these
countries, FDI is only a small proportion of the overall economy. And, indeed, in none of
the countries do programme revenues bring in more than 0.3 per cent of GDP. As such,
there is little risk of macroeconomic destabilisation to the national economy.
Figure 3. Residence by investment (RBI) as a proportion of foreign direct investment
(FDI) and gross domestic product (GDP)
Sources: Bulgaria: Investment Bulgaria. Greece: Enterprise Greece. Ireland: Department of Justice and Equality. Latvia: O ce of Citizenship and
Migration Affairs. Portugal: Immigration and Borders Service. Spain: Ministry of Labour and Migration. Eurostat: FDI. World Bank: GDP.
How about real estate? Many have been concerned that residence by investment
programmes can price locals out of housing. Our  ndings do indeed show that when
investors have multiple investment options before them, they almost invariably select
real estate over possibilities like investment funds, bank deposits, government bonds,
and charitable contributions. To truly investigate the impact on real estate value requires
neighbourhood-level data, which we don’t have. However, the available country-level data
suggest that real estate destabilisation through the programmes is not a great concern.
In the countries with the biggest programmes, golden visa investments represented only
a small proportion – under 5 per cent and typically much less – of total real estate
transactions.
The programmes simply aren’t large enough to make a difference. Indeed, citizens from
elsewhere in the EU represent a much larger proportion of foreign investors and are far
more likely to destabilise real estate markets. However, they have not caught the
attention of the media in the same way that wealthy, often racially distinct “others,” from
outside Europe do. There is, though, one very important exception, namely Greece. In
2018, the country’s golden visa programme accounted for over one-third of all real
estate transactions. In this case, destabilising of the property market through the
programme is a real possibility.
Table 1. Signi cance of residence by investment (RBI) within the
real estate market
Note: italicised numbers represent estimates. Sources: Portugal: Idealista and Registradores. Spain: Ministry of Labour
and Migration. Greece: Enterprise Greece. Latvia: Viesturs, Pukite, and Nikuraze (2017).
What does the future look like for these programmes?
The economic turmoil brought on by COVID-19 is likely to increase the attractiveness of
these options for countries searching for a shot of foreign investment that can go
straight into the arm of economies in a COVID coma. It’s also likely to increase the
attractiveness of such programmes to wealthy people looking to hedge their risks by
securing mobility options.
Before the pandemic, national-level health statistics were insigni cant in the selection
programmes – and one might also note that all EU countries require applicants to
demonstrate that they have private health insurance. But the signi cance of health care
as a decision factor may change going forward. COVID-19 may also bring a shift away
from a short-term “tourist-like” calculation and toward a more medium-term calculation,
as people look for a place to stay for longer stints. Given the market dynamics, it may be
that even as Brussels pressures countries to end such schemes, they instead simply
adapt them – perhaps by adding greater demand for human capital contributions,
effectively transforming them into more active business investor programmes – rather
than cut this easy revenue source entirely.
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Notes:
• This blog post is based on “Are Golden Visas a Golden Opportunity? Assessing the
Economic Outcomes of Residence by Investment Programs in the EU”, by Kristin Surak and
Yusuke Tsuzuki, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2021). 
• The post expresses the views of its author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of LSE
Business Review or The London School of Economics and Political Science. 
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